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WHAT TO M) WHEN THE EXPERTS DISAGXEE 
Michael A. Stoto 
INTR9DUCTION 
Policymakers often call on experts  to  help assess the facts underly- 
ing complex policy decisions. The experts give advice on, for example, 
t h e  cu r r en t  or  future s tate  of the economy, the technological potential of 
a new research  or  development effort, t he  future distribution of popula- 
t ion  and their demand for services, the  ecological effect of a new road,  
factory,  or  power plant, or  the risk to life and limb associated with a new 
energy facility. Unfortunately, from the  pclicymakers' point of view, the  
exper t s  often disagree. Actually, the disagreement is sometimes a bless- 
ing in  disguise. 
The aim of this paper  is to  consider when and how a policymaker 
would want experts  t o  agree, how to  s t ruc ture  the initi.al charge to  the  
experts, and how to deal with the results in order to make the most of 
their answers. We will use a particular case, three risk assessments for a 
proposed liquid natural gases (LNG) transfer facility in California, as an 
example throughout. The problem is of course more general, and we gen- 
eralize whenever possible. The first section of the paper discusses the 
issue of whether analytical work and especially formal risk assessment, is 
useful to policymakers. The next section gives some details about LNG 
and the California case. We then consider the three main issues: 1) why 
experts disagree, and when this is desirable, 2) how a policymaker can 
structure the problem, from the beginning, to get the most out of his 
expert advisers, and 3) what conclusions a policymaker should draw from 
a set of disparate risk assessment. The paper concludes with a section on 
implementing these ideas. 
1. THE ROLE OF RISK ASSESSldENT 
From the outset, we will need to make a number of assumptions 
about the role of formal risk assessment in the policy process. The 
desirability of these proposals has been discussed at  length elsewhere, so 
the arguments behnd them will be only briefly sketched. 
1. Information helps poiicymakers. (Hoaglin, et.al., 1982, especially 
Chapters 1 and 14). The availability of new information can set up con- 
flicts and lead to confusion (Mazur, 1973). Yet in terms of making the 
best decision for Gsociety, it is hard to argue that we are better off by 
sticking our heads in the sand. This position assumes a certain amount of 
rationality in the policy process. 
2. Assessing the risk is only one part of the decision making process. 
Evaluating the alternatives and choosing among them is the other part 
(Raiffa and Zeckhauser, 1981). The aim of risk assessment is to supply 
the policymaker with necessary information to aid the choice, not to sug- 
gest a decision. Engineers and scientists are no better than others in 
deciding whether a proposed facility is safe enough; their conlparative 
advantage is telling others how safe it really is. 
3. It is desirable to separate the assessment of the likelihood of 
potential consequences from the evaluation of the alternatives. (Raiffa 
and Zeckhauser, 1981). For example, when deciding whether to build an 
LNG facility, it is better to explicitly estimate the probabilities of one, 
ten, or a hundred deaths, and then decide if the economic benefits 
exceed these human mortality costs, than to combine these two steps. 
Although this separation may seem difficult and uriatural ,  it is important 
because: 1) scientific facts may be complicated, and no single person 
may have mastered them all, 2) an explicit approach facilitates peer 
review, 3) analysis is not static, and an explicit approach helps to uncover 
and fill in weak spots in our knowledge, and 4) the assessment may be 
valuable to other policy-makers for other decisions. 
4. It is helpful to be precise about 0 1 s  uncertainty (Raiffa and Zeck- 
hauser, 1981). Statements like "the risk is low" mean different things to 
different people, therefore, are really meaningless. It is better for an 
expert to say "my best guess is ten expected deaths per year, but the 
real answer could be between one and one hundred with 90 percen-t pro- 
bability." An expert who makes a statement like this may be right or 
wrong, but a t  least we know what is intended. Winkler (?967), Raiffa 
(1968), Savage (1971), Tversky and Kahneman (1974), Hogarth (i975), and 
Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (19'75) discuss methods of eliciting per- 
sonal probabilities and potential biases in the process. 
2. LNG AND THE CALIFORNIA SITING DECISION 
As a concrete example of a situation where the experts disagree, let. 
us consider a specific case study by Lathrop and Linnerooth (1982). In 
1972, two California utilities created the Western LNG Terminal Company 
to construct and operate facilities to transfer, store, and distribute liquid 
natural gas from Alaska and Indonesia. 
Natural gas is expensive to transport because of its high volume. 
One way to make t r a n sp ~ r t a t i on  over seas or long distances economically 
feasible is to condense the  gas. Cooling the gas to below -162 degrees 
centrigrade turns it into a liquid and reduces the volume by a factor of 
. . ~ 
about six hundred (Mandl and Lathrop, 1982) the process involves liquefi- 
cation plants in the sending areas, special ships and ports to transport 
and transfer the liqaid, and gasification plants in the receivicg areas. 
Western originally proposed t~ build three facilities to transfer, store and 
regassify LNG. After an  initial round of regulatory and legislative action, 
only one site, Point Conception, was still under consideration. 
One major drawback of LNG use is the potential of a very serious fire 
causing many-deaths. The d.anger arises when an accident causes a leak 
in a ship or land based. storage tar ! ,  or in the transfer facilities. The 
escaping Liquid warms and forms a claud of flammable gas, which in. turn 
can  envelop p ~ p u l a t e d  areas and ignite. The number of casualties 
depends on how far the cloud travels before it either ignites or dissipates. 
The risk to life and limb is obviously one of many factors affecting 
the decision of whether to  build an LNG facility a t  Point Conception. To 
assess the magnitude of this risk, and to strengthen their arguments in 
the regulatory proceedings, various parties commissioned three formal 
quantitative studies. Western, the company proposing to build the facil- 
ity, commissioned one study by Science Applications, Inc. (SAI). This 
study concluded with the statement: 
"As shown, the highest fatality probability is one ch.ance in 14 million 
per person per year within one and one-third miles of the site, 
decreasing to probabilities ranging from 1 chance in 1 billion to 1 
chance in 10 billion per person per year or less within 2 miles of the 
site. The probability of one occurence of 10 to 100 fatalities is one 
chance in 29 billion per year, and the maximum fatality count per 
occurrence is 54, with a probability of 1 chance in 760 quintillion 
(760 followed by 18 zeroes) per year." (SAI, 1976, pp. 1-12) 
The California Public Utility Commissicn, required by law to approve LNG 
sites, commissioned Arthur D. Little, Inc. (ADL) to  do another study of the 
same site. They concluded that: 
"These analyses indicated that the probability of an accident involv- 
ing ten  or more casualties due to the proposed project was around 
1 0-a per year (100 million years recurrence interval) for existing 
population levels. .." (ADL, 1978, p. 13) 
Finally, the Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (FERC), whlch also 
had to review the plans, conducted its own risk assessment of the Point 
Conception and other sites. The tabular summary of their quantitative 
results include: 
Robability of a 
Maximum Expected Exposed Fatality per Exposed 
Location Fatalities per year Population Perscn per year 
1 Point Conception 1.13x10-~ 15 7 . 8 3 ~ 1  o - ~  1 
Here are three expert assessments of the "risk" associated with the 
same LNG facility. As is most often the case in similar circumstances, the 
experts do not agree. Let us imagine ourselves as a decisionmaker, say a 
administrative law judge, who has to decide whether or not to allow 
Western to build the facility. Among the many factors one must consider 
is the "risk" of the proposed facility. What should we do in the face of 
these three reports? 
We begin by examining the reasons why the experts disagree. Some 
of these reasons for disagreement can and should be avoided by prior 
arrangements with the experts. Others cannot be avoided, and. in fact the 
range of expert opinion sometimes carries useful information. After this, 
we turn to a discussion of what can be done in advance to make the 
results of risk assessments most useful. One issue is to what degree the 
risk assessments should be independent of each other. Another is the 
appropriate scope of the analysis. We follow t h s  with a discussion of ways 
to compare and combine the quantitative risk assessments in hand if a 
decision must be made today. IVe conclude by suggesting a system to 
implement these ideas. 
3. WHY DO EXPERTS DISAGREE? 
When several experts are asked to provide information for poli- 
cymakers, different experts often provide different information. In some 
cases, the differences arise from lack of agreement about what the prob- 
lem is, and proper coordination could reduce the confusion. In other 
cases, the differences are in some sense "real", and are  important for the 
policymaker to be aware of. A third set  of differences reflect bias, and 
should be avoided. Mazur (1973) discusses a number of these sources of 
disagreement with regard to expert opinion on the safety of fluoridation 
of drinking water and low level radiation from nuclear power plants. 
There are a number of ways that poor coordination between experts 
can leac! to differences in risk assessments. The three Point Conception 
analyses provide some concrete examples: 
1. Problem Limits. Whle ADL and SAI considered risks associated 
with vessels, transfer of the  LNG, and storage facilities, FERC only con- 
sidered vessel accidents. Other things equal, t h s  would decrease FERC's 
estimates of the overall risk. This difference is obvious, but many more 
subtle versions are common. For instance, analysts must decide whether 
vessel accidents 5, 50, or 200 miles from the terminal, or  even a t  sea or 
a t  foreign ports, should be included. Presumably risks to life are much 
higher when the ship is near a populated area, but  the risk to seamen and 
other vessels may not be negligible. 
2. werat ing Conditions. SAI made its risk estimate assuming larger 
ships and more storage tanks than did FERC and ADL. Ths  would natur- 
ally increase SAl's risk estimate, but not in a simple way. Other less obvi- 
ous differences could be due to timing of ship arrivals, docking pro- 
cedures, construction standards, and so on. 
3. Background Assumptions.  The number of people assumed to be 
a t  risk -- that is living close enough to be affected -- ranged from 15 in the 
FERC study to 90 in the SAI study. Part of t b s  disagreement was due to 
different assumptions about future population growth. Assumptions 
about future traffic patterns a t  nearby airports and missile ranges are  
similar sources of differences. 
4. Reporting Language. Final results can be stated in a number of 
ways. ADL gives "the probability [per year] of an accident involving ten  or 
more casualities." SAI gives the "fatality probability . . .p e r  person per 
year", for people living at  varying distances from the site, "the probability 
of one occurence of 10 to 100 fatalities . . .p e r  year", and the probability 
per year of an accident with "the maximum fatality count." FERC's sum- 
mary statistics are in terms of "maximum expected fatalities per year" 
and "probability of a fatality per exposed person per year". Often risk 
statements are in the form of recurrence times rather thm probabilities, 
or probabilities are for periods of one, ten, or  twenty years. This problem 
often cannot be solved by simple mathematical conversion from one 
language to another; to do that  often r e q ~ i r e s  more information than is 
available to the user of a risk analysis. A more extreme version of this 
problem is that some experts consider more consequences than others, 
for instance injuries as well as deaths. Vaupel (1982) points out that any 
single statistic usually presents a biased picture of the policy relevant 
information. I t  is better  to  choose a small number that fully present the 
issue. 
5.  C o n s c i o u s  Omissions o r  C o ~ d i t i o n s .  Often risk assessors cons- 
ciously decide to omit certain risks, such as sabotage, or condition or 
certain events, such as the non-occurence of war. To the extent that 
these omissions or conditions are different from one risk assessment to 
another, different summary figures will result. 
Each of these five types of disagreements is spurious in the sense 
that  it does not reflect real disagreement among the experts about the 
risk in any gi.ven situation. It simply reflects the fact that  the experts are 
considering different situations. Yet the disagreements are disconcerting 
to  policymakers and the public, and can be confused with deeper expert 
disagreement arising from scientific uncertainty. Furthermore, these 
differences most often cannot be reconciled retrospectively -- the calcu- 
lations have to be done almost from scratch if new assumptions are to be 
used. Proper coordination, that is advance agreement on exactly what 
situation will be  considered and what language will be used, can reduce 
such disagreements, and focus attention on deeper and more important 
differences. 
A second group of sources of disagreement reflect, in a sense, more 
basic or underlying scientific uncertainty. Again, the Point Conception 
case provides some examples: 
1 .  Models .  Each of the three risk assessments used a basically simi- 
lar framework to  assess the overall risk of an  LNG facility. This consisted 
of studying the conditional probabilities of a chain of events: a ship colli- 
sion, an  LNG spill, vapor cloud formation, dispersion, and ignition, and 
fatalities. In addition similar models were built to assess the risks associ- 
ated with transferring and storing the LNG. These models serve as a 
framework with wh c h  to combine more basic information and data from 
experience or experiments. But such combining models are necessarily 
simplifications of reality. And different modelers make different simplifi- 
cations. Perhaps the most striking example of different models is the 
description of the dispersion, and ignition of vapor clouds. This is a very 
complex physical problem which depends on wind, weather conditions, 
surface geometry, and many other factors. One indicator of the uncer- 
tainty associated with choice of model is the fact that ,  while the ADL, 
FERC, and SAI models were developed on the basis of the same data on 
small spills, ADL and FERC find that the downwind dispersion distance 
increases with decreasing wind speed, SAI finds the opposite. A more sub- 
tle .example is the assumption of independence between certain events. 
Presumably the probability of grounding is higher near the shore, and the 
expected number of people exposed to a vapor cloud is also hgher .  Yet 
some models do not consider t h s  interaction (to consider all possible 
interactions would clearly be impossible) and different risk estimates 
result. 
2. Sources of Data. To estimate the probability of an  event for whch  
we have little or no direct experience, risk assessors have a range of 
alternatives. At one extreme they can consider a large data base for 
events very different from the one under consideration, and mak, a some 
sort of subjective or analytical adjustment. An example of thls would be 
estimating the probability of a. collision based 01.1 data for al! s h p s  off thc- 
California coast. At the other extreme, essessors could use a much more 
limited number of observations ior a more restricted but more similar 
set  of events. For instance, they could only c o ~ s i d e r  tanker accidents in 
a more restricted part of the coast. At the first extreme, subjective judg- 
ment (as  used by ADL and SAI) or explicit modeling (as used by SAI) intro- 
duces uncertainty. At the other extreme, uncertainty is primarily due to 
weak statistical inferences from limited experiences. Thus, both the 
choice of what data are considered relevant, and the manner of adjust- 
ment from limited experience, lead to  differences in risk assessment. 
3. Judgmenta l  Probabi l i t i es .  For some components of the risk esti- 
mation almost no data are available. For instance, FERC and SAI both use 
models where the probability that the vapor cloud ignites depends on the 
probability that each person enveloped by the cloud ignites it. But no 
hard data is available for this latter probability. FERC's judgmental esti- 
mate is 0.0025, but SAI's estimate is 0.1, leading to a larger number of 
fatalities. I11 general, judgmental estimates are used when data are lack- 
ing, so can be  a major source of disagreement between risk assessors. 
4.  Imag ina t ion .  Some experts are simply more imaginative than 
others, and thus consider a broader range of risk sources. SAI, for exam- 
ple, considered only ship collisions, but not ramming the dock or ground- 
ing. ADL considered, but SAJ ignored, the probability of storage tank 
failure to  storm and waves. On the other hand, SAI,-but not ADL, con- 
sidered the probability of a simultaneous rupture of more than one tank, 
due to a common cause, such as an earthquake. 
5. Uncer ta in t y  About Consequences.  There is a considerable amount 
of uncertainty about the physical effects of LNG vapor ignition. There is 
certainly a thermal effect, and perhaps a blast effect. Both have direct 
and indirect effects, such as building fires or collapsed buildings. And 
there is little agreement on how much heat  radiation for how long is 
necessary to cause a fatality. Since we have no experience with large LNG 
spills or fires, scientific opinion on these questions is diffuse. 
6 .  T r a f n i n g  a n d  B a c k g r o u n d ,  Scientists from different fields often 
approach problems in different ways. In particular, they use different 
models, have access to and use different sources of data, and have dif- 
ferent ideas about physical consequences. Some experts may be better 
than others at developing judgmental probabilities, and some are clearly 
more imaginative. So because each of these differences leads to variation 
in risk assessments, drawing experts from a wide range of background 
wiil lead to a range of risk assessments. 
7 .  S t a t i s t i c a l  FZuc tu~z t ions .  Estimates of probabilities or conse- 
quences based on statistical sampling techniques or on the outcome of 
experiments exhibit variability due to random sampling fluctuations. 
Standard statistical techniques such as confidence intervals are useful to 
describe the magnitude and effect of this source of variability. 
Each of the above sources of disagreement between experts 
represents a sort of true natural-science uncertainty. These are prob- 
lems of trans-science (Weinberg, 1972) whose resolution is often either 
impractical or impossible. Decisionmakers need to know the range of this 
uncertainty for two reasons. First, it may be possible to deve l~p  better 
information for a particul?.rly crucial point of disagreement. An analysis 
of the reasons for disagreement could help locate su.ch a situation. For 
instance, the overwhelrriing source c.f disagreement among the Point, Con- 
ception analyses was the probability cf a ship collision, which ranged from 
1.3 x IC-' according t9 SAI to 5 x lo-' according to FERC. More informa- 
tion on this probability is clearly necessary. But. the second, and perhaps 
more important, reason to consider natural-science uncertainty applies 
when there is more than one decision maker. If a range of risk estimates 
are believable, opposing parties can maintain that one or the other 
extreme is the best estimate. An understanding of the true range of 
uncertainty allows us to see whether a party's position is reasonable, or 
whether it capitalizes on the presence of some uncertainty to justify an 
unreasonable position. 
An example helps here. If we were trying to decide whether to build 
at a certain site, it would be best to know, with little uncertainty, that the 
expected number of fatalities is lo-' per year. Then the political debate 
could weigh this known probability against the benefits of the facility. 
More realistically, we may find that'there is a good deal of natural-science 
uncertainty, and that the data and msdels can support any expected 
number of fatalities between lo-' and per year. If is accept- 
able but is not, more analysis is necessary. But at least knowing that 
values higher than are unreasonab!e allcw us to discount the argu- 
ments of a party that implicitly assumes that the risk is 1 o - ~ .  
The third group of sources of disagreements involve bias of one sort 
or another: 
1 .  Intentional Deception. Since experts like to please theii- clients, 
there is an obvious incentive for them to shade the analysis in one direc- 
tion. And when there is considerable natural-science uncertainty it is 
easy to do so. Withn a reasonable range t h s  is an integral part of the 
adversary system, but it is possible to go beyond what is reasonable. This 
type of deception is hard to detect in a complex analysis, and harder to 
prove. In the Point Conception case, Mandl and Lathrop (1982) liave 
ranked the three risk assessments on a number of specific issues and 
found no indication that  any one was consistently more conservative. 
But, as we have mentioned above, the probability of collision is the key 
variable, and it is estimated by SAI (who represents the utilities) to be 
less than as high as estimated by FERC. 
2 .  Conservative Es t imates .  For expedient or benevolent reasons, 
experts often give conservative risk estimates, that  is estimates that they 
believe are high. For instance, ADL (Summary, page 10) assumes that "all 
persons within a vapor cloud fire are casualties." Their reasoning is that  
people inside fire-proof structures might escape injury, but this is hard to 
model. But if the facility is deemed safe with t h s  conservative assump- 
tion, it will surely be safe in actuality. Conservative estimates also arise 
when assessors do not trust  the decisionmakers, so "for the good of 
society" they say, increase the risk estimates. The problem with conser- 
vative estimates is that they tend to cascade (Raiffa and Zeck- 
hauser,1981) and thus yield overall risk estimates much higher than rea- 
sonable. An honest decisionmaker will either be misled, and perhaps 
make the wrong dec i s i~n ,  or be forced to compensate somehow for an  
unknown amount of conservative shading. 
Little can be said in favor of either of these biases that  lead to differ- 
ences between risk assessments. Perhaps a good peer review system can 
help us to detect and eliminate differences due to intentional deception. 
Openness and a sense of trust ,  which may be hard to obtain are the solu- 
tions to the problem of conservative assessors. 
4. SIMULTANEOUS RISK ASSESSMENTS 
In risk assessments, as in other policy problems that depend on 
"expert" opinion, policymakers should request a number of simultaneous, 
independent, expert studies of the same problem. Individual experts 
bring preconceptions and biases to any problem. These result from stan- 
dard methods and assumptions that vary from field to field, and from pol- 
icy views of the experts or their employer as to how the question should 
be decided. Simultaneous studies by experts with a wide range of techni- 
cal backgrounds and policy views will (1) increase the completeness of 
the analysis by bringing up more of ths relevant risks, (2) lead to better 
estimates of the component risks and thus the overall risk, and (3) give 
some idea of the certainty or uncertainty of the final results. The first 
two goals concern better point estimates. The t h r d  concerns knowledge 
of the reliabilities of our results. If every risk assessment in the range of 
uncertainty would lead to the same policy decision, we could stop. Other- 
wise, more information could be sought. 
One important question is the degree of inde2endence between the 
simultaneous studies. To be sure, some coordinati~n is desirable. For 
instance, the experts should agree in advance on the target. In the LEG 
analysis, t h s  means that they should make the same set of ass*anptions 
about the number of ships per year, the physical layout of the facilities, 
and the populakion at  risk. And the expcris should agree in advance on 
the definitions of risk, be they societal risk, Ra.smusr;en cilrve7, or any 
combination of the available mzasures. Preliminary agreement makes 
the final results more comparable, and helps to I'ocus attention on real 
differences in expert cpinion. 
There are two extreme forms of gathering in2ependent expert opiil- 
ion. In one case, someone could set  out a framework for analysis, and 
groups of experts could fill in estimat2s of critical quantities. In the LNG 
risk analysis, t h s  approach would mean, for instance, that  the expert 
would supply the ?robability of a spill, the probabilities of immediate and 
delayed ignition, and a probability distribution for distance downwind a 
vapor cloud can travel. The other extreme is to ask a group indepen- 
dently to formulate the analytical framework,develop the data and esti- 
mate the necessary parameters. Depending on the nature of the prob- 
lem, the optional use of experts will be somewhere between these two 
extremes. 
The first alternative -- independent experts working on a common 
framework -- has a number of virtues. First, since all of the experts would 
be dealing with the same variables defined in the same way, peer-review 
would be straightforward. Second, different people are experts in dif- 
ferent aspects of the problem, and such a disaggregated approach could 
help to focus the work of the experts in their area of expertise. Th rd ,  
this a.pproach would clearly identify the areas with the most uncertainty, 
and allow us to target our further research in those areas. 
This disaggregated approach could contribute to the first goal of 
simultaneous studies -- c~mpleteness  -- by providing a systematic frame- 
work within whch many experts could search for all of the risks. Gut it is 
not easy to deal with a new risk discovered outside of the analytical 
framework. It helps the second goal -- accurate estimates of the com- 
ponents -- because averages are generally better than single opinions. 
But the corn-mon framework approach does not yield an accurate 
estimate of the true range of uncertainty -- the thlrd goal of simultaneous 
studies. In many problems, and LNG risk analysis is one of them, there is 
no single appropriate analytical model. Models are approximations of the 
world, and must by their nature make simplifying assumptions. Different 
models yield different risk estimates, so relying on the common analyti- 
cal framework leads to an overly optimistic view of the certainty of the 
estimate. 
One example of this problem is that  model builders, for lack of 
better information or to  avoid excess complication, often assume that 
certain probabilities are  independent. In the Point Conception LNG case, 
it seems that  the events of a ship collision and the wind dispersion of a 
vapor cloud were considered to be independent,, and the probability of 
each was averaged over the distribution of weather conditions. But in 
foggy weather, the probability of a ship collision is presumab!~ higher, 
and vapor clouds travel further. Doing the probability calculations with 
the full distributions leads to higher risk estimates than averaging at  
each stage. Similar problems arise from assumptions about the type of 
analytical model, or functional forms for extrapolation. 
The main virtue of the second alternative -- independent formulation 
of the framework and estimation of the parameters -- is that the resulting 
range of estimates more nearly reflects the true uncertainty in the risk 
estimate. In addition, the variability of the average of n independent 
observations is smaller than if the ob~ervat ior~s  were positively corre- 
lated. In the extreme, there is no point in paying for more than one study 
i f  they all will give the same answer. Of course there are commocly 
accepted methodologies in the risk assessment business, and common 
data sets are often used. But the pressures of an adversarial system, 
countered by a reasonable peer review of the analyses, will tend to 
expand the range of estimates towards an accurate assessment of the 
true uncertainty in the risk estimate. The difficulty with the total 
independence approach is that different experts structure the problem in 
different ways, and define different intermediate variables, so only the 
overall risk estimates are comparable. 
The two approaches to the use of experts can be combined in a 
number of ways. There could be, for example, a small number of indepen- 
dent frameworks proposed, and panels of experts asked to estimate the 
parameters of each model. Or the work could proceed in stages, with the 
first step consisting of a panel of experts independently deriving models, 
and the second stage consisting of each expert estimating the parame- 
ters  for the other's models. Both approaches would lead to more com- 
plete and accurate risk estimates, as well as realistic estimates of the 
true uncertainty. 
In order to coordinate the use of experts, Dalkey and Helmer (1963) 
have developed the "Delphi Method". This procedure involves the 
repeated use of an anonymous questionnaire. Feedback on quantitative 
estimates and their justifications from previous rounds encourages panel 
members to reconsider extreme estimates. Anonymity prevents strong 
personality from dominating the group. But the goal of the process is to 
achieve expert consensus, not to  estimate the range cf possible views. 
Press (1978) and Press, Ali and Yang (1979) describe a n  alternative pro- 
cedure with only qualitative feedback. This, they feel, relieves pressure 
for consensus where there is none. 
The first goal in risk assessment should be to estimate the risk itself. 
By facilitating the comparison and aggregation of intermediate and final 
results, simultaneous risk assessments helps acheve better  estimates. 
The second but not less important goal is to know how reliable the risk 
estimate is. If the uncertainty is small, the policy decision will depend on 
other factors, and the arguments will be related to values. If the uncer- 
tainty is large, it is possible that  more work, say, an  experiment, could 
resolve the differences, and would be worthwhile. More likely, the deci- 
sion will be made in the face of uncertainty, but all will be better served if 
the  full range of risk possibilities, especially the higher end, is known. 
Simultaneous risk assessments lead to better point estimates, and some 
degree of independence leads to a realistic estimate of the uncertainty. 
5. THE EAGIX YERSUS THE WORM 
Risk assessments are  typically done from a "worm's eye" point of 
view -- the problem is disaggregated into smaller and smaller pieces until 
the  assessment team cannot see the big picture any longer. For instance, 
the  Point Conception risk assessments were based on very detailed 
models of ship movements, metalurgic studies of storage tanks and their 
behavior under stress, the dispersion of a vapor cloud over sea and land, 
weather conditions, and so on. T h s  approach has some obvious benefits, 
and some might say it is the  only way to proceed. But the alternative -- 
taking an  "eagle's eye" view of the problem -- also has some merits, arid 
deserves serious attention. 
Perhaps the strongest argument for the worm's eye approach is that 
there are no overall experts. There may be experts in s h p  collisions, 
me talurgy, gas dispersion, and weather conditions, but no individual can 
be expected to master all of the subtleties of these and other important 
disciplines. The worm's eye approach allows us to coordinate the exper- 
tise of many individual assessors. 
Parallel to this argument is the fact that little d.ata exists that is 
relevant to the big picture. We have very little experience with LNG 
operations, and less with accidents, but much more that relates to com- 
ponents of the risk assessment process. For instance, by disaggregating 
wa can bring in data on general shipping accidents, chemizal plant opera- 
tions, and the physics of gas dispersion and ignition. The worm's eye 
approach allows us to make inferences about a complex problem based 
on a number of specialized data sets. 
Disaggregation is a.lso extremely useful in an adversarial situation. 
The worm's eye approach permits risk assessors to lay 9ut their reason- 
ing in a way that others can follow and thus exposes their analyses to 
peer criticism. Detailed arguments based on a number of data sets and 
mathematical models certainly a r e  more conducive to criticism and dis- 
cussion than a necessarily judgmental eagle's eye risk assessment. Prior 
coordination of simultaneous risk assessment, as described earlier, helps 
to facilitate the peer-review process. 
Another a.rgunent for the worm's eye approach is that the process is 
not static, and 2 disaggregated approach lends itself to updating when 
more or better inforamation becomes available. If a risk assessment con- 
sists of a computer model to combiae data-based a d  judgmental 
estimates of specific probabilities and consequences, updating simply 
means re-running the program with a different input value. In the Point 
Conception case, additional information became available on earthquake 
risks late in the decision process. With a disaggregated model, t h s  new 
information should be easy to incorporate. 
Finally, the components of a disaggregated model may have other 
uses. Risk assessments of other LNG facilities will be called for in the 
future, as well as other operations that involve transporting or storing 
hazardous material, and some of the components developed for the Point 
Conception assessment could be easily adopted. 
The major problem with the worm's eye approach is that it focuses 
attention on specific details of the risk assessment and tends to ignore 
the struciure of the combining model. Ths is particularly dangerous 
because the way in whch the details are combined is potentially, and 
often actually, more important than the details themselves. 
The worm's eye approach, with its reliance on documentation and 
derivation, favors the use of narrow analytical models and discourages 
the use of judgment. For instance, model builders favor linear extrapola- 
tion of one sort or another to a more speculative judgment-based 
approach because it is easier to justify and defend, regardless of whether 
it is more appropriate. 
Similarly, the worm's eye view dops not tend to give adequate con- 
sideration to the way that the parts are combined. All of the Point Con- 
ception risk assessments worked with the probability of a ship accident 
and with the likely dispersion of the resulting vapor cloud. No doubt, 
separate experts made good estimates of the relevant probabilities. But 
the combining models each assumed that these events are independent. 
This is certainly an easy assumption to make, and makes the calculations 
and their documentation easy. But because weather conditions and loca- 
tion in t%e channel effect both probabilities, the assumption of indepen- 
dence is just not right, and could have an important effect on the overall 
assessment. The problem of common-mode failures is a similar example 
of inadequate combining models common to the worm's eye approach. 
Disaggregation leads to a proliferation of numbers and assumptions 
as well as very complex computer programs. Risk assessment teams only 
have a fixed amount of time and effort to spend on any project, and hav- 
ing more details must often lead to less careful attention to each indivi- 
dual one. If minor errors in small details tended to cancel, perhaps this 
inevitable lack of attention would not be serious. But in fact, in complex 
models, one small slip could have a major effect on the end result. And 
complex models and computer programs are difficult to verify. 
Finally, the worm's eye approach may use experts in a way that is 
not best suited to ellcit their expertise. Dreyfus and Dreyfus (1978) have 
argued that an expert at  his or her best thnks  intuitively and holistically, 
and does not do complex calculations. Only beginners thlnk through 
every step. Thus asking experts to estimate probabilities and likely 
consequences for a narrow analytic model is asking them to forsake their 
expertise. 
In risk analysis of low probability events, taking the eagle's eye point 
of view is equally difficult. Tversky and Kahneman (1974) discuss many 
subtle biases in assessing probabilities directly. Pratt and Zeckhauser 
(1982) discuss biases in probability assessments based on one alarming 
event. Fairley (1981) has pointed out that even many years of experience 
with no problems provides little evidence about the size of a small proba- 
bility. And of course we are talking about facilities that have not yet been 
built. There is little direct experiential evidence on the risk of LNG facili- 
ties. 
But there is extensive evidence on the risks of more or less similar 
industrial activity. Surely, no two industrial experts would make the 
same judgment about the numerical risk of a proposed facility. But they 
might be able to give reasonable estimates of the range of uncertainty by 
making a series of extreme assumptions and comparisons to other types 
of industrial activity. Mosteller (1977) discusses some helpful procedures 
for making such order-of-magnitude estimates. The presence of more 
than one assessment would serve both as a check for extreme assump- 
tions, and as an indication of the degree of certainty. The range of cer- 
tainty of such an estimate would obviously be large -- five or ten orders of 
magnitude. But realistic ranges of uncertainty for the more complex 
models, as we will see later, are equally as large. 
When dealing with very small probabilities, the Law of Outrageous 
Events comes into play. Suppose that a complex risk analysis estimates 
that the probability of an azcident involving ten or more fatalities is 
about lo-''. Can such a small number be correct? Perhaps it can be, 
conditional on the assumptions of the model. But then there always is the 
possibility that an outrageous event will occur. In the LNG case, sabotage 
is an obvious excluded possibility, but so is a tidal wave. Each of these 
may have small probabilities, but compared to lo-'', they may be large. 
The point is tha t  when the worm's eye approach comes up with a very low 
probability, we must  begin to explore possibilities that would otherwise 
not be worth considering. 
There is, of course, no reason to take only one approach. A detailed 
worm's eye analysis provides many insights about the risk problem, and 
may lead a n  assessor to a be t ter  understanding of the situation. But the 
estimates should be tempered with an  independent eagle's eye considera- 
tion of whether the magnitude of the results a re  reasonable. 
6. COMPARING AND COMBIPIING HSK ANALYSES 
The previous discussion concerns steps to be taken in advance of or 
during the work of risk assessment teams to make the results more com- 
parable and suitable for public decision making. But often decisions must  
be made on short notice with no chance to  garner new data  or modify old 
analyses. Faced with a decision and a small number of inconsistent risk 
analyses, what should a decisionmaker do? 
Our approach here assumes that  experts are unbiased, and try their- 
best to  p r ~ v i d e  probability assessments that are independent of their pol- 
icy views. But even so, there will be differences due to natural-science 
uncertainties and perhaps lack of coordination. So we will behave as if we 
have multiple estimates of the same quantity, as  if chosen as samples 
from the same (subjective) probability distributioc. The goal is to assess 
and summarize ths  u n d e r l y i ~  diskibution of expert opinion. The suppo- 
sition that  experts can give estimates tha t  a re  not influenced by policy 
views may be  optimistic, but  it a t  least provides a starting point, and 
perhaps a goal to strive for. In the next section we consider modifications 
when we are not confident that the expert assessments are independent 
of their policy views, and tend to group in two schools. 
1. Pick a Favorite. Dealing with conflicting information is difficult, 
so policymakers are often tempted to simply pick a favorite study and 
ignore the others. If there were only one appropriate approach or 
answer, t h s  strategy could possibly work, but  as we have seen, t h s  is not 
the case. The trans-science aspect of risk analyses and most other public 
policy problems implies there is no single appropriate answer, but  a 
range of possible answers. Reporting a single number tends to hide the 
important fact that  there is substantial scientific disagreement. Even if 
there were a single best answer, it is not clear how a policy maker could 
find it among the  pack. 
2 .  Ave~age the Results. Another approach'is to average the final 
results. For instance, the "societal risk" estimates for Point conception 
were as follows (Mandl and Lathrop, 1982): 
SAI 1.10-' expected fatalities per year 
ADL 7.10-' expected fatalities per year 
F E R C  l . l ~ - ~  expected fatalities per year 
The average of these numbers is 6.0x10-~ expected fatalities per year. 
But t h s  procedure makes a number of questionable assumptions. First, it 
gives each assessment equal weight. It is quite conceivable that we would 
want to give more weight to the more reliable experts, in the way that we 
use weights that  are inversely proportional to variance to yield the most 
efficient statistical summaries. But it is not clear how to derive these 
weights, short of extensive precious experience with the experts. And 
assessing an expert's track record is exceptionally difficult if the goal has 
been to estimate very small probabilities. DeGroot (1974) gives one 
approach to developing such weights based on the expert's opinions of 
one another. Hogarth (1975) reviews other methods, and concludes that 
equal weights often perform well compared to self-ratings or past perfor- 
mance. Second, averaging does not take into account any information we 
may have about potential sources of bias. In addition, there is a question 
of scale. For small risks, the order of magnitude is the crucial issue, 
therefore, the logarithmic scale is appropriate (Hofstadter, 1982). For 
the three Point Conception, estimates averaging in the logarithmic scale, 
or, equivalently, using a geometric mean, yields 4.lxl0-', whch differs 
slightly from the straight average of 6.0x10-'. If the risks are substan- 
tially different in order of magnituse the choice of scale makes a differ- 
ence. For instance, the straight average of and lo-* is 5 .0005~10-~ ,  
fifty times higher than the geometric mean of lo-'. If order of magni- 
tude is the key question, the second approach seems to yield a more 
natural summary. The main benefit of averaging is protection from reli- 
ance on a single estimate that could t.urn out to be unrealistic. An alter- 
native is to use the median assessment, which is not overly aifected by 
one outlying estimate. 
3. Bayesian U p d a t i n g .  Morris (1974, 1977) and others have sug- 
gested Bayesian updating as a way of combming expart evidence. The 
basic idea is that each expert assessor i wolrld make an estimate of the 
risk, p i ,  and that the decisionmaker would combine these with an a  p r ~ k r i  
subjective distribution on the true risk, n. Ths  approach has a number of 
problems. First, the decisionrnaker must make explicit and use a priori 
distributions for rr. Policymakers are not used to thinking in these terms, 
and there are obvious problems with multiple parties with different prior 
ideas. Second, to use Bayes' Law, the decisionmaker must have a subjec- 
tive distribution for what each assessor will say, given the true risk rr. 
This is one way to build in some prior notion of potential bias, but is 
extremely difficult to quantify. Given this complexity, Bayesian updating 
does not seem to offer a practical solution to the problem of disagree- 
ment between experts. 
4.  Sample Based Distribution Assessments. If the separate assess- 
ments can be regarded as independent estimates, the range of estimates 
can be used as a guide to the true uncertainty of expert opinion. An 
example from the Point Conception case helps here. Both ADL and SAI, 
but not FERC, made calculations of the annual probability of ten or more 
fatalities due to an LNG accident. The high estimate was ADL's at 
1.0x10-', and the low estimate was SAI's at 2.2~10-". A policymaker's 
initial thought may be that this interval must nsarly cover the range of 
possible expert opinion. In fact, there may be a substantial probability 
that a new expert would make an estimate outside the interval. 
Because of the scale problem, let us work with logarithms to base 10. 
In this scale, D L ' S  estimate is -8.00 and S-M's is -10.66. Let us assume 
that there is some true risk, but that, because of uncertainty in the esti- 
mation process, the assessments can be regarded as independent obser- 
vations from a Normal distribution centered around the true risk. The 
object is to estimate the center of the distribution, the true risk, and the 
variance, a measure of the uncertainty. With these assumptions, the best 
estimate of the true risk is the average of the two observations, -9.33, or 
converted back into probabilities, 4.72 lo-''. For a sample of size two, 
the standard deviation can be estimated as 0.886 times the range, that  is, 
2.30. In terms of percentiles, the subjective distribution based on these 
calculations, in terms of probability, is: 
Percentile 10 25 50 75 90 
Probability of Ten 
or More Fatalities 4.5~10-l3 1.2~10-l1 4 . 7 ~ 1 0 - ' ~  1 . 8 ~ 1 0 - ~  : 4 . 9 ~ 1  o - ~  
This range is quite large, so one would say that  there is not much cer- 
tainty about the risk of the  proposed plant. The major assumption here is 
that  the two risk assessments are independent. If the estimates were 
made for or by opposing parties, there might be a tendency for one to be 
too high and the other too low. In this case, the calculated range tvould 
be too large. Similarly, if the t w ~  assessors were biased in the  same 
direction, the calculated range understates the true range of uncertainty. 
If there are a number of simultaneous, independent, disaggregate 
assessments, the same approach can be extended. For instance, the 
annual probability of more than. t en  fatalities (due to a s h p  accident) can 
be estimated es the product of a series of conditional probabilities: the 
probability of a s h p  collision, the probability of a spill given a collision, 
the probability that a vapcr cloud forms given a spill, and the praobability 
of a blast or  fire killing more than t en  people given the f ~ r m a t i o n  of a 
cloud. According to the AEL and SAI risk assessments, the probability of 
this chain of events In much higher than other chains leading to similar 
accidents. There are, of collrse, other ways to specify the chain, but. this 
particular description allows easy comparison of the three Point Concep- 
tion risk assessments. Table 1 gives the estimates of these probabilities 
taken from each of the reports. FERC does not calculate the last condi- 
tional probability. 
Geometric 
ADL FXRC SAT Mean 
- 
P(Col1ision) 9.5x10-~ 8.8~10-~ 7.3x10-~ 8.5x10-~ 
P(Spill]Collision) 8. OX 1 0-2 4.5x10-~ 2.5~10-I 4.5x10-~ 
[ p ( s~ i l l ) l  7.6x10-~ [~.OXIO-~][I.~~IO-~I [3.0~10-~] 
P(Cloud(Spil1) 0.1 0.1 0.1 0.1 
P(> 10 deathlspill) 1.3x10-~ -- I . ~ X I O - ~  3.9x10-~ 
P(> 10 deaths) 1.0x10-~ -- 2.2~10-" 1.5x10-~ 
7 
Sources: ADL 1978a, pp. 5-4, 5-21; ADL 1978b, p. 13; FERC 1978, p. 533; 
SAI 1976, pp. 1-6, 1-12, 5-31, 8-149; and calculations. 
First, by averaging each conditional probability, we can take account 
of the FERC estimates of the first two parts of the chain. The product of 
the mean conditional probabilities is 1.5~10-~, slightly more than the 
4.7~10-'~ average of the ADL and SAI final estimates. Second, if the indl- 
vidual conditional estimates are independent, and we continue with the 
assumption that  the uncertainty in all of the estimates has a Normal dis- 
tribution in the log scale, we can calculate the uncertainty of each com- 
ponent of the estimate, and calculate the joint effect on the final result. 
First note that  estimates of the probability of a collision and the con- 
ditional probability of a spill seem to be negatively correlated: FERC gives 
the lowest probability of collision but the highest conditional probability 
of a spill, and SAI is just the opposite. Most likely, FERC was generous in 
what it labeled a "collision", so had a higher probability of collision, but a 
lower probability of a spill. For this reson, let us multiply the two 
together, and use instead the unconditional annual probability of a spill. 
Let P be the probability of ten  or more deaths. This is the product of 
three factors: Q, the probability of a spill; R, the conditional probability of 
a cloud forming; and S, the conditional probability of ten or more deaths. 
Each is assessed with some uncertainty; let U S .  u i  . and u$ be the vari- 
ance of the logarithms of Q , R , and S respectively. Then if the assess- 
ments of Q . R . and S are independent, ut, the variance of the logarithm 
of P is 05 + u$ + us. All three estimates of R are the same. so we might 
say that  o$ = 0. More realistically, there should be some uncertainty, but 
it will be small compared to the other two components. The common log- 
arithms of the maximum and minimum estimate of Q are -3.40 and 
-5.74. For three independent observa-tions, .591 times the range is an 
estimate of the standard deviation. Thus UQ = .591(2.34) = 1.39. Simi- 
larly, for two independent observations, us = .886(1.03) = 0.91. Thus, the 
variance of P is 
= US + u$ + us = ( 1 . 39 )~  + 0' + (0.91)' = 2.76 
and up = 1.66. 
Based on these calculations, the quantiles of the subjective distribu- 
tion for the probability of an accident are: 
Percentile 10 25 50 75 90 
Probability of Ten 
or More Fatalities 1 . 1 ~ 1 0 ~ ~ ~  1 . 1 ~ 1 0 - ~ ~  1 . 5 ~ 1 0 - ~  2.0x10-~ 2 . 0 ~ 1 0 - ~  
The simplicity of this approach comes from the assumptions of the loga- 
rithmic scale for for multiplicative probabilities and independence of 
assessors and components of athe assessment. More complex probability 
models or computer simulations could be used for the same purpose if 
these assumptions did not hold. 
S u b j e c t i v e  D i s t r i bu t i on  A s s e s s m e n t s .  A final way to deal with a set of 
divergent expert opinions is to hire another expert to review the reports 
and to report a subjective probability distribution summarizing the risk 
estimates. The new expert could use some of the techniques mentioned 
above, but could also combine the information in a less formal way, and 
take other factors into account. The role of the new expert is to provide a 
"best" estimate of the risk, and more important, to define a range of 
"reasonable" values to focus the insuing political decision on values 
rather than facts. It is obviously important to find an unbiased expert to 
combine the various opinions, but since we seek a range of reasonable 
values, rather than a single best number, such a process is possible. 
Arthur (1982), for instance, provides such a review of current estimates 
of world oil resources. 
As an example of this process, I asked two IIASA colleagues to provide 
their subjective probability distribution on the annual probability of an 
accident involving ten  or m.ore fatalities. Each expert has a technical 
background and has worked closely with the three Point Conception risk 
analysis reports, as well as the others studied in the IIASA LNG risk pro- 
ject. To assess their subjective distributions, I used the methods 
described by Spetzler and Stael von Holstein (1975) and Morgan, Henrion 
and Morris (1979). These include an initial discussion with the experts 
concerning their knowledge of the situation, their biases, exactly what 
probability is being estimated, implicit conditions, and in what scale they 
feel most comfortable working. For instance, the first expert felt com- 
f ortable directly assessing the annual probability of a n  accident involving 
ten fatalities due to any cause, including sabotage. The second was more 
comfortable separately assessing the probability of such an accident 
under normal conditions and due to sabotage, and wanted to give proba- 
bilities for a fifteen year period. By simple probabilistic calculations, I 
was able to convert the second expert's distri5ution into terms consistent 
with the first's. The loth, 25th, 50th, 75th, and 90th percentil- a s  are as 
follows: 
Percentile 10 25 50 75 00 
Expert 1 1 , O X I O - ~ ~  50x1 o - ~  1 . 3 ~ 1 0 - ~  2 . 0 ~ 1 0 - ~  1 . 0 ~ 1 0 - ~  
Expert 2 4 , 0 ~ 1 0 - ~  5.0~10-' 3 . 2 ~ 1 0 - ~  2 . 0 ~ 1 0 - ~  7 . 8 ~ 1 0 - ~  
The fact that these distributions are  reasonably close -- they differ 
by about one order of magnitude -- suggests that the process of assess- 
ing subjective distributions is reliable and gives an  honest assessment of 
the best estimates of the risk (about l T 4 )  and the range of reasonable 
disagreement among experts (about TO-' to lo-'). These results are  sub- 
stantially different from and higher than the estimates based on mechan- 
ical combination of the individual estimates. Because the subjective 
results are both more complete (they include sabotage, for instance) and 
more considered, they are probably more realistic. 
The techniques discussed here relate to estimating and reporting the 
distribution of expert opinion for single quantities. Decisionmakers of 
course need more information. First, as we have discussed above, no sin- 
gle number carries all of the policy relevant information. Policymakers 
want to  know about the expected number of fatalities, probabilities of 
small accidents and major disasters, separate estimate of the probability 
of sabotage, and so on. Different parties are concerned about different 
aspects of the problem. Thus, the distribution of expert opinion should 
be simultaneously assessed for a number of quantities. Second, decision- 
makers need to know the reasons for expert disagreement as well as the 
range of possible values. Knowledge of the reasons for disagreement 
helps us estimate the likelihood that more effort ( an  experiment, for 
example) would produce agreement, and also helps us to choose among 
the estimates if a choice must be made. 
There is of course no single correct technique for combining and 
comparing expert opinion. The methods discussed here all have their 
strengths and weaknesses. Perhaps it is best to try as many approaches 
as possible, and then attempt to understand why they differ. In any case, 
whoever does the combination and comparison should remember that 
assessing the range of disagreement is as important as getting the single 
best estimate. 
7. BIASED EXPERTS 
The techniques in the previous section rely in a number of places on 
one crucial assumption, that experts are unbiased. In statistical terms,  
we can be more precise, and say that the process of obtaining an  expert 
assessment is like drawing a sample from a distribution. We have assumed 
up until now, that  the expert opinions were all being drawn from the same 
distribution. But there are a number of reasons to question that  assump- 
tion, and explore consequent changes in the procedures for combining 
expert opinion. 
There are  a t  least two situations that could lead to bimodal distribu- 
tions of expert opinions. One involves a natural-science uncertainty, and 
the other arises when experts can not separate assessments and values. 
Of course, the two may be related. 
In some situations, one single natural-scien.ce uncertainty overrides 
all of theothers.  For instance, one of the key factors in assessing the risk 
associated with the disposal of nuclear wastes the biological effects of low 
level radiation. Most of our information about the effects of radiation 
comes from studies of animals or humans exposed to relatively h g h  
doses of radiation. Dose-response curves then provide a means of extra- 
polation to lower doses. But there is little agreement on the appropriate 
shape of such curves. The choice of a linear model over a threshold 
model in a risk estimate implies a difference of many orders of magni- 
tude. The effect of other modelling choices is small. cornparsed to this one 
factor. Thus if one school of experts believes in the linear mcdel, and a 
second school believes in some other model, risk estimates vsill tend to 
cluster in two groups. I t  would be misleading to summarize the expert 
opinions with a single number, or two assume a simple unimodal distribu- 
tion. 
As much as we would like to think that experts can divorce them- 
selves from values in making their evaluations of the probabilities and 
consequences of potential decisions, t h s  is often not possible. Scientists 
are also men and women of the world, and like everyone else, have views 
on policy matters. Even if they try to make estimates to the best of their 
ability it is likely that  subtle biases will creep in whenever judgement is 
called for. Experts of like persuasion tend to associate with one another, 
and thus be exposed to similar ideas about appropriate models or data. 
The net  result of shading a number of factors in the same direction is a 
bimodal distribution of the final estimates. And if there is a single dom-' 
inant natural science uncertainty a s  discussed above, experts with simi- 
lar political views will tend to group in one extreme or the other. Of 
course, if experts are acting as advocates, these tendencies will be even 
stronger. 
If expert opinions are bimodally distributed, picking a favorite 
implies choosing one school and totally ignoring the other. Similarly, 
averaging the  estimates is also misleading. First, a single average hides 
the important fact that  there really are two divergent points of view. A 
number in the center in not regarded as correct by either school. 
Second, if the experts really form two distinct groups, averaging is like 
voting: the relative nwnber of opinions in each group is the crucial fac- 
tor. But there is usually no reason to suspect that the number of experts 
in each group, either in the sample, or in the population, has any mean- 
ing. The fact that  three times as many experts take one position as 
another does not mean that the first position is more likely to be correct. 
Of course this reasoning does not go on forever -- if only one out of one 
hundred scientists believe in a position, we do have reason to be suspect. 
Perhaps a better alternative to a single average is one average for each 
group, if they can be identified as such, and the number of experts taking 
each polar position. 
As discussed in the previous section, Bayesian updating theoretically 
offers a means of correcting for bias, but there are a number of difficul- 
ties. First, the decisions maker, if there is a single one, must be able to 
specify probabilistically the extent of each expert's bias. This is obviously 
a difficult task for someone unskillecl in the language of probability. But 
more importantly, decision makers have no way of knowing the magni- 
tude of an  expert's bias, even if they can guess the direction. And if 
experts knew that  they were being second-guessed, they might t ry  to  
overreact, and thus hopelessly confuse the situation, or simply refuse to 
participate. 
The techniques for assessing the distribution of expert opinion that  
were discussed earlier are strongly dependent on the assumption of 
independence, so are not appropriate for experts who are biased. One 
alternative is to assume that  the range of expert opinions corresponds to 
the range of possible values. The two grouFs would have the tendency to 
move as far apart as possible. But the decisionmakers who have to use 
the information have no way of knowing how extreme the expert positions 
are. They do not know, for instance, whether the probability that the risk 
exceeds the hghest  value presented is 0.1 or 0.001. I t  all depends on the 
zeal of the experts. 
Perhaps a subjective distribution assessment is the best alternative, 
but even that has a number of difficulties. Perhaps a consideration of the 
political stances of the experts together with detailed review of their 
reports could produce an informed view of the extent of bias in their 
assessments, and suggest a realistic range of possibilities. At the least it 
could help the decisionmakers to realize that there are two polar posi- 
tions on the matter, and help to sort out the likelihood of each. But if 
there are no unbiased experts to provide the inputs, it will be difficult to 
find an unbiased, but informed, expert to combine the results. 
Bias is a serious problem in risk assessments primarily because we 
do not know its magnitude, even though we may suspect its direction. We 
thus do not know what we are buying. Finding experts who can report 
estimates that are independent of policy views, and urging them to try, 
tends to make their results easier to interpret, and thus much more use- 
ful. 
8. COORDINATION AND REVIEW 
Up until now, the discussion of how to structure the interaction with 
experts and combine their resalts has been quite optimistic. It has 
assumed that information on the probabilities arid consequences of 
accidents would help the decision-makers, and that it is a good idea to 
separate the functions of assessing and evaluating risks. Bilt matters are 
not that simple. 
For one thing, where there are rrlaltiple risk assessments, they are 
often not done sinultaneously. Instead they are commissioned by the 
various interested parties as they become necessary. Thts has two impor- 
tant ramifications. First, since plans for the facility naturally evolve over 
time, operating assumptions, and the resulting risk assessments, will 
differ. Second, if one study is already in the public domain, it is hard for 
subsequent analysts to be independent. 
Perhaps a more basic difficulty is that  the assessments are often 
commissioned or even carried out directly by the parties themselves. 
Even if one agrees in principle that  the functions of assessment and 
evaluation should be separate, it is hard to  resist the temptation to shade 
questionable judgments a t  every stage. But as we have seen, opposing 
biases does not necessarily lead to good summary measures, or informa- 
tive estimate of the true uncertainty. These problems are of course 
worse if the parties to the decision are unsymetrically supplied with 
experts. 
In addition, once the assessments have been performed (no matter 
how), someone must compare, combine, and translate them for the 
decisionmaker. Risk assessments are very complex, and their reports 
are often exceptionally difficult for even a trained scientist to read. Sum- 
marizing this information requires a substantial amount of judgment, s o  
the question of bias again appears. 
One solution of these problems is to have some sort of impartial 
board or arbitrator to coordinate the experts before they do their assess- 
ments, and to compere, combine, and translate the results into plain 
English afterwards. The responsibility of thts board would be to lay out 
what is known in an impartial and informative manner for all of the 
interested parties, and to define the range of "reasonable" assessments. 
Policy decisions based on t h s  common information would then reflect 
differences in how the parties value the alternatives, not on differences of 
opinion of the probabilities and consequences involved. 
One might ask how unbiased individuals could be found to perform 
this function, and there are a number of possibilities. In labor negotia- 
tions professional arbitrators are often called in to settle disputes. Their 
job is harder since they have to deal with values as  well as facts, so simi- 
larly unbiased technical risk assessors should be available. Perhaps 
academics, preferably from another part  of the country, would be a good 
source of unbiased information coordinators. 
Ackerman e t  al. (1974) have proposed an independent board com- 
posed of technicaliy trained individuals to review analytic studies for pol- 
icy decisions. This board's objective is to assess the analyses in plain 
English on four dimensions: 1) the empirical basis for the report 's find- 
ings, 2) the extent tha t  the technical discussion diverts attention from 
other factors, 3) the "scientific competence" of the  analysis, and 4) the 
inherent limitations of the  approach. To this we would add the functions 
of choosing the experts and coordinating their work. Ackerman e t  al ,  sug- 
gest that  if the jurisdiction of the board is wide, it will be difficult for a 
single interest group to capture the board, or pack it with sympathetic 
members -- as the number of issues increases, it becomes harder to find 
analysts whose technical learnings all correspond with a n  interest group's 
policy views. The "product" of the review board would be a published 
report  aimed a t  the decisionmaker, but available to all interested parties. 
If all agreed in advance that  the review board's report would define the 
territory for the subsequent policy battle, all sides (including poorly 
financed opposition groups) would have access t o  informative, reliable 
and usable risk assessinents. 
In the California case (Lathrop and Linnerooth, 1982), an administra- 
tive law judge was the final arbiter between the applicant, the federal 
regulatory agencies, and the local residents. This judge or his staff would 
have been the logical one to convene such a board. With the increasingly 
sophisticated scientific and technological arguments, in regulatory cases 
today, it would not be unreasonable to build permanent staff expertise for 
coordinating expert evaluations. 
The three other cases studied by the IIASA group offer similar poten- 
tial locations for the coordinating function. In the Netherlands (Schwartz, 
1982) the question of whether to build an LNG facility in Eemshaven was 
eventually decided by the national cabinet because of the large number 
of issues involved. The decision to build LNG and associated facilities in 
Mossmorran in Scotland (Macgill, 1982j was eventually decided by the UK 
Secretary of State for Scotland. In fact, both the Dutch cabinet and the 
Scottish Secretary of State did commission single expert risk assess- 
ments that  were used by both sides. The studies could have been 
improved by-asking for a  small^ number of independ.ent, simultaneous, 
quantitative studies. 
In the Fecieral Republic of Germany (Atz, 1982) a number of narrow 
risk assessments were made by various independent experts at early 
stages of the debate about an LNG facility in W:lhelmshaven. But before 
the Federal Miristry of Transportation t m k  its final decision, all of t.11e 
expert studies were reviewed and analyzed by a worlcing group of the 
Advisory Committes for the Transportation of Hazhrdous Goods. This 
committee is a permanent board of experts for the Ministry. Even though 
four of the five members of the working group had already been involved 
in the decision process, the committee was able to reach a concensus. 
The basic point is that in most cases where expert opinion can help 
inform policymakers even though many parties have a say, there is still a 
single individual or agency changed with the final decision. All of the par- 
ties would be well served if thls single "pointman" coordinated the infor- 
mation gathering, thus focused attention on the political evaluation of the 
alternatives, not their technical assessment. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Making good use of experts in a policy decision requires planning and 
coordination. If we agree that the role of experts is to inform, not to 
decide, then policymakers must take a number of steps before and after 
the experts do their work. 
Before they begin their work, someone must coordinate the experts 
so that they are working on the same problem. There are enough real 
sources of disagreement and no reasons to add spurious ones. Second,the 
experts should work independent-ly. This leads to better estimates of the 
true risk, and just as importantly, to a realistic idea of the range of 
uncertainty. Technical, model based assessments and subjective judg- 
mpnts both have a role. Finally, it is important to use experts who can 
report honestly on tneir assessment of the scientific facts and uncertain- 
ties. Although bias is hard to avoid, it leads to confusion in interpreting 
the expert's assessments, and should be reduced wherever possible. 
After the experts have communicated their results, hard work is still 
required to distill their varied conclusions into a single report. Simple 
methods like averaging help to obtain a single number, but ignore the 
range of uncertainty. Because we may want to obtain new information, or 
set  bounds on reasonable arguments, it is just as  important to report the 
uncertainty as the best estimate. Ths  is especially true if there are two 
or more discrete schools of experts. Mechanical and subjective combina- 
tions of the individual results can convey to policymakers an  accurate 
picture of what and how much the experts really know. 
Most policy decisions, although they involve many parties, are ulti- 
mately decided by one person or committee. Ths  focus could provide a 
good location for a technically trained "expert coordinator." This person 
or committee could serve to both coordinate the work of experts in 
advance, and to combine and compare their conclusions in the end. The 
effect would be a better  informed policy process, and one in which the 
arguments concerned the values that parties place on the various propo- 
sals, and didn't exploit scientific uncertainly for political purposes. 
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